Are There Causal Constraints on Justified Belief?

In this forthcoming paper, I formulate a debunking argument based on the thought that we need to justify
maintaining beliefs whose content seems to play no role in the best explanation of why we believe them.
Which is relevant because, if moral non-naturalism is true, we can explain why we possess our moral beliefs without invoking them. Any competitor explanation assuming their truth is less compact and thereby worse. Our moral beliefs are thereby explanatorily impotent in explaining why we have them, so we need to justify continuing to believe them. We can thereby conclude that we should only maintain these beliefs if there is some additional reason to do so. I offer a systematic, comprehensive defense of an evolutionary debunking argument inspired by that line of thinking. Relying on the principle that, for our beliefs to be justified, they must be best explained by the
facts they are about.

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